Where money and approvals touch hardware: card terminals that emit ISO 8583 / EMV data into the graph, a security key that signs the evidence an approval rests on, an enclave that holds the consortium's blinding key, and private set intersection between banks. The devices are simulated at $0; signatures, hashes and key exchange are real.
Recent card taps
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0 alertedPOS and ATM twin, last 20
From the Wokwi ESP32
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source = wokwitaps posted by the simulated board
Enclave
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PCR0 · SHA-384attesting…
Bank sync links
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–bank graphs through the enclave
API /hardware/* · connecting…
Screen recordings of public third-party tools reading BankWeave's own output: the Wokwi simulator running our sketch, EMVLab decoding our TLV, webauthn.me decoding our assertion, and FalkorDB Cloud showing the node the signature writes.
Loading recording…hardware/wokwi/sketch.ino on a simulated ESP32-DevKitC. Each button press is an HTTPS POST to /hardware/pos-tap; the OLED shows the response and the serial monitor prints the card, the ISO 8583 response and EMV field 55.
Loading recording…The EMV TLV from a live terminal tap pasted into EMVLab's BER-TLV decoder: amount 9F02, IFD serial 9F1E, application transaction counter 9F36 and cryptogram information data 9F27 = 80 parse cleanly.
Loading recording…A passkey assertion from an approval signature, decoded by Auth0's WebAuthn debugger: the clientDataJSON challenge is the case Merkle root, the origin is the BankWeave site, and authenticatorData carries the flags and signature counter.
Loading recording…FalkorDB's own browser on our Cloud instance: the cross-bank ring, algo.pageRank, the (:Account)-[:CARD_TXN]->(:Terminal) edges the terminals (and the Wokwi ESP32) write, a SAR's provenance chain and vector KNN. Read-only queries; hostname cropped.
Also used as an external check: OpenSanctions ↗ for sanctions matches on case pages, and Chrome's virtual authenticator ↗ for WebAuthn without a physical key.
| Piece | Real | Simulated |
|---|---|---|
| Card terminals | BER-TLV encoding (decodes on EMVLab), ISO 8583 field layout, CARD_TXN and USES_DEVICE writes to FalkorDB, alerts the agents triage, impossible-travel and ATC-replay detection | the terminals and cards; 9F26 is an HMAC, not a chip's 3DES/AES MAC |
| ESP32 on Wokwi | the circuit runs in the Wokwi simulator and makes real HTTPS posts to this API | the board is a simulator |
| Security key | WebAuthn ES256 verification, signature counter, Merkle root over claims, evidence and sentences, seal break on revocation | VaultKey is a WebCrypto key in this tab (WebAuthn can use a real key) |
| Enclave / HSM | HMAC-SHA256 blinding, SHA-384 PCRs, ES384-signed Nitro-style document, EnclaveAttestation nodes, ingestion refused with 423 while quarantined | no TEE hardware or AWS Nitro PKI chain |
| PSI | X25519 scalar multiplication, commutative blinding | both banks run in one process |